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Abstract
In this article I shall defend, against the conventional understanding of the matter, that two
coherent and tenable approaches to time reversal can be suitably introduced in standard
quantum mechanics: an Borthodox^ approach that demands time reversal to be represented
in terms of an anti-unitary and anti-linear time-reversal operator, and a Bheterodox^
approach that represents time reversal in terms of a unitary, linear time-reversal operator.
The rationale shall be that the orthodox approach in quantum theories assumes a
relationalist metaphysics of time, according to which time reversal is nothing but motion
reversal. But, when one shifts gears and turn to a substantivalist metaphysics of time the
heterodox approach to time reversal in quantummechanics comes up in amore natural way.
Keywords Time reversal .Metaphysics of time . Substantivalism . Relationalism .
Quantum theories
1 Introduction
There is a well-seated tradition tracking back to the work of Eugene Wigner (1932) that
has formally characterized the notion of time reversal in quantum theories in terms of
an anti-unitary and anti-linear time-reversal operator. According to such an approach,
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time reversal must be mathematically represented by an operator TA that not only
transforms the variable t as t→ − t, but also performs a complex conjugation (ψ→
ψ∗) and changes momentum’s sign (P→ − P). This view has been supported by the
overwhelming majority of physicists and philosophers of physics, both in its formal
aspect (Wigner 1932, Gibson and Polland 1976 and the majority of specialized
textbooks) as well as in its conceptual bases (Sachs 1987; Roberts 2017). I shall call
it Bthe orthodox approach^ to time reversal in quantum mechanics (OA thereafter).
Despite this widely-extended consensus, there is an alternative view on time reversal
that characterizes it in terms of a unitary and linear time-reversal operator, TU. This
approach typically comes up in the literature in two quite different ways: (a) as an
unacceptable way to formally represent time reversal in quantum theories (see for
instance Gasiororowicz 1966: 27); and (b) as a more genuine and broader way to
formally represent time reversal in physics (see Albert 2000; Callender 2000). Overall,
this approach claims that time reversal must be mathematically represented by t→ − t,
and that other magnitudes’ behavior under time reversal should be worked out by way
of examining whether they are time-derivative or not. I shall call this approach the
Bheterodox approach^ (HA from then on).
Which approach is the correct one? At first glance, this is not a purely philosophical
question inasmuch as the notion of time reversal involves scientific and empirical
research on symmetries in fundamental physics. But it is not an exclusively scientific
question either, inasmuch as the notion of time reversal has been conceptually insight-
ful to face genuine metaphysical concerns as that of whether time has a privileged
direction. However, there is a further and deeper sense in which the question is
eminently philosophical: not only is time reversal understood differently in each
approach, but they also endorse unalike metaphysical commitments with respect to
the nature of time. I think that the literature has largely overlooked this strongly
philosophical side of the above-mentioned question, and has rather hinged on its
scientific aspects solely.
In this paper, I shall develop further this overlooked philosophical side so as to show
that both approaches can be suitably defended, although on different metaphysical
grounds. In particular, I shall on the one side argue that OA involves a relationalist
metaphysics of time, according to which time reversal is nothing but motion reversal.
Within this underlying metaphysical framework, TA arises as the only way to correctly
represent time reversal in quantum theories. On the other side, I shall claim that a
proper defense of HA can be reliably pursued on an alternative metaphysical back-
ground: as long as one holds a substantivalist metaphysics of time, one can properly
endorse HA and neutralize most of the arguments favoring TA against TU. The article
overall aims to show, against the conventional understanding on the matter, that there is
not one single way to represent time reversal in physical theories to the extent that there
is not univocal understanding of what time reversal is, metaphysically speaking.
The structure of the article is as follows. In Section 2, I will give a general
presentation of time reversal and time-reversal invariance in physics. In Section 3, I
will introduce OA and HA. In Section 4, I will put forward some physical arguments to
support OA, and then I will show its underlying metaphysical component
(relationalism). In Section 5, I will argue that HA can be successfully defended from
a substantivalist metaphysics of time, and I will show how OA’s arguments against HA
can be overcome. In Section 6, final remarks.
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2 Time reversal and time-reversal invariance in physics
Symmetries, as invariances with respect to a transformation X, have increasingly gained
relevance in physics (see Brading and Castellani 2007; Baker 2010; Dasgupta 2015;
Caulton 2015). In particular, the symmetries that physical theories have or lack shed
light on the type of structure required by those theories. Time reversal and time-reversal
invariance (or time symmetry) are just an instance of this: whether a physical theory is
time-reversal invariant or not would illuminate the type of temporal structure assumed
by the theory. Therefore, if a physical theory fails to be time-reversal invariant, then the
theory structurally distinguishes the past-to-future direction from the future-to-past one.
This is not only interesting from a purely scientific view, but also from a philosophical
one: time-reversal invariance has, for instance, profound implications for the arrow of
time debate (Horwich 1987: 52–55, Price 1996: 116, Wallace 2012).
To the extent that the time symmetry is an invariance under an operator that stands for a
change of direction of time, a good deal of what time symmetry actually means is encoded
in how one characterizes such a time-reversal operator (T-operator henceforth). First, it is
relatively uncontroversial in the physicist’s and philosophers of physics’ community that
time reversal is a theory-dependent notion as long as the proper characterization of the
time-reversal operator changes across theories (but see Savitt 1996 and Peterson 2015 for
discussion1). Secondly, time reversal is often understood as a transformation acting upon a
dynamical law bymeans of an operator T that reverses time (see Castagnino and Lombardi
2009 for a defense of why time reversal applies to dynamical laws). According to this
view, time-reversal invariance is a property that dynamical lawsmay instantiate or not: the
property of ‘being invariant under the action of reversing the direction of time bymeans of
a T-operator’. When a dynamical law is T-invariant, it is said that the equation has a pair of
temporally-mirrored physical evolutions (i.e. solutions of the equation): one being future-
directed with +t, and the other one past-directed with –t. The property of ‘being T-
invariant’ can therefore be defined as following:
A dynamical law L is T-invariant iff, if et is a solution of L, then Tet exists and is
also a solution of L.
Naturally, the non-existence of Tet means that the dynamical law lacks the property of
being T-invariant, that is, the law is asymmetric under the action of inverting the
direction of time in it.
3 The orthodox and the heterodox approaches to time reversal
in quantum theories
One needs to put some flesh on the bones of the T-operator. So, how is the T-operator
formally characterized in the quantum context?Most physics textbooks (see for instance
1 Despite this theory-dependency, some attempt to coarsely characterize time reversal in a theory-independent
way. Steven Savitt (1996: 12-14) has inventoried three kinds of time transformations that might be fairly called
‘time reversal’; some of them boil down to a proper characterization within a physical theory, but others intend
to be broader. Recently, Daniel Peterson (2015) argued that some accounts of time reversal (which he calls
‘intuitives’) start out by characterizing a time-reversal operator from a theory-independent perspective.
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Gibson and Polland 1976, or Ballentine 1998) commonly start out by warning against,
so to speak, classical expectations that time reversal merely maps t→ − t by means of a
unitary T-operator, TU. Taking for instance Schrödinger’s equation,
2 textbooks typically
bring up an anti-unitary operator (TA) that not only does it flip the t’s sign, t→ − t.
TH ψj i ¼ iℏ ∂T ψj i
∂Tt
¼ H ψj i ¼ −iℏ ∂ ψj i
∂t
ð1Þ
but also takes the complex conjugate (K) on (2).
KH ψj i ¼ −iℏ ∂K ψj i
∂t
ð2Þ











Evidently, Schrödinger’s equation is T-invariant under TA.
3 Strictly speaking, TA is a
combination of a unitary operator and an anti-unitary one: TA =UK, where U is the
unitary operator and KzK−1 = z∗. Notably, TA is also demanded by definition (see, for
instance, Ballentine 1998: 377–378) to change the sign of momentum, TPT−1 = − P.
One should bear in mind that such stipulation establishes a smooth continuity between
time reversal in classical mechanics and in quantum mechanics: not only does time
reversal transform the same magnitudes similarly, but it also keeps the theory’s
fundamental equation invariant. Indeed, the features of the unitary operator U are a
consequence of the classical conditions for time reversal, namely, TxT−1 = x, TPT−1 = −
P and TσT−1 = − σ (see Sachs 1987: 34).
So, I will take OA as claiming that
& OATime reversal in quantum theories must be represented by a T-operator whose
form is given by the TA-operator
Either by strengthening OA or by pursuing a positive defense, time reversal has been
represented differently. Some authors have argued that a T-operator should not involve any
other property over and above that of turning t around (see, iconically, Callender 2000,
Albert 2000; Costa de Beauregard 1980 also defends such view in quantum field theory).
So, when onewrites Schrödinger’s equation down and then applies a time-reversal operator
T that merely changes the sign of t and of all those quantities expressed in function of time
(or non-basic magnitudes, in Albert’s vocabulary), one obtains the eq. (1) again,
TH ψj i ¼ iℏ ∂T ψj i
∂Tt
¼ H ψj i ¼ −iℏ ∂ ψj i
∂t
And that is all what one should expect time reversal to carry out. Period. This is
essentially HA’s spirit.
2 I will completely circumscribe myself to Schrödinger’s equation. Some interpretation-dependent dynamical
equations can also be considered as part of the formal apparatus of quantum mechanics, for instance in GRW
or Bohmian Mechanics.
3 To be clear: ‘being T-invariant under TA’ means ‘being TA-invariant’ as TA specifies the form of the T-
operator.
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A couple of clarifications are in order here. To begin with, as opposed to
OA, this heterodox way to define a T-operator does not take into account
whether it must change the sign of momentum or not. In fact, it should not.
In the second place, T is now a unitary and linear operator, TU, as it does not
take the complex conjugation on states. This feature is particularly trouble-
some here for it is what produces a minus sign on the right side of the
equation. In other words, as T is a unitary-linear operator, then THT−1 = − H,
entailing that if |ψ⟩ is an eigenstate of the Hamiltonian with energy E, then
the temporally mirrored eigenstate T−1|ψ⟩ should involve negative energies –
E. It is quite easy to see that there is an obvious asymmetry in (1) (indeed, a
very deep and radical one) as one obtains no solution at all when time
direction is inverted this way. In this respect, the Schrödinger equation is
non-T-invariant under TU
4.
I will thus take HA as claiming
& HATime reversal in quantum theories must be represented by a T-operator whose
form is given by the TU-operator
4 Underpinning OA: Three physical arguments and a relationalist
metaphysics of time
There are at least three closely-related arguments to underpin OA, and to
thereby cast HA aside. Indeed, the three are built on a reductio ad absurdum
structure, differing in one of the premises. The first argument has been famous-
ly introduced by Eugene Wigner in 1932, and I will call it Bthe involution-
based argument^; the second argument relies on the fact the Hamiltonian’s
spectrum must remain bounded from below (that is, it must not involve
negative energies), and I will call it Bthe Hamiltonian-based argument^; and
the third one establishes that momentum (in this case, the momentum operator,
P) must change its sign under time reversal, and I will call this third argument
Bthe momentum-based argument^. I will spell them out before coming to set
the relationalist metaphysical background that supports them.
4.1 Three physical arguments
I. Let us start with the involution-based argument. Wigner’s introduction to
time reversal begins by claiming that time reversal is a transformation such
that, when the following operations are sequentially performed, one obtains
the identity:
time displacement byt  time reversal  time displacement byt  time reversal ¼ I ð4aÞ
4 To be clear: ‘being non-T-invariant under T_U’ means ‘being non-T_U-invariant’ as T_U specifies the form
of the T-operator
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Taking T as any T-operator that meets (4a), one obtains that:
T UΔt2T UΔt1s0ð Þ½  ¼ s0 ð4bÞ
Where s0 is the initial state, and Δt1 = t1 − t2 = t2 − t1 = Δt2. What this means is that time
reversal represents an involution, where after applying time reversal twice, one should
obtain the initial state again. So, an appropriate T-operator in quantum mechanics must
meet conditions (4a) and (4b): to be a T-operator is to be an operator that generates an
involution as specified above. Next, Wigner establishes that T has to preserve transition
probabilities as well (otherwise, an involution is no longer possible)
ψjφð ij j ¼ TψjTφð ij j ð4cÞ
Beyond this characterization of the T-operator in quantum theories, Wigner has so far
remained silent about the specific form of T. His famous theorem claims that T must be
either unitary (TU) or anti-unitary (TA). As TU meets neither (4a), (4b) nor (4c), time
reversal must be represented by TA –tertium non datur. To be clear: TU is discarded as an
appropriate representation of time reversal just for it does not satisfy the very definition
of time reversal expressed in the above-mentioned conditions. The structure of this
reductio ad absurdum argument can be straightforwardly sketched as follows:
(1) Assume that TU fairly represents time reversal
(2a) If TU represents time reversal, the TU generates an involution (meeting 4a, 4b
and 4c)
(3a) As matter of fact, TU does not generate an involution as it does not meet
above-mentioned conditions
(C) TU does not represent time reversal
As there are only two games in town, it directly follows that TA represents time reversal.
II. Let us move on to the Hamiltonian-based argument. Schematically represented,
(1) Assume that TU fairly represents time reversal
(2b) If TU represents time reversal, TU keeps the Hamiltonian invariant
(3b) Asmatter of fact, TU does not keep the Hamiltonian invariant as TUHTU−1 = −H
(C) TU does not represent time reversal
Let me spell premises (2b) and (3b) out. The reason of why the Hamiltonian must
remain invariant under time reversal is that, otherwise, an involution would no longer
be possible: in order to be able to represent a quantum system in a backward-moving
evolution, its Hamiltonian must remain within the positive spectrum at any cost (just to
provide some references, see Gasiororowicz 1966: 27, Gibson and Polland 1976: 78,
Sachs 1987: 36). Quantum states are said to be Bphysically meaningless^ (in the light of
non-relativistic quantum mechanics itself) when their Hamiltonian’s spectrum features
negative energies. Putting it drastically, physical systems with negative energies must
not be considered as quantum mechanics systems any longer. I will take fully for
granted that a Hamiltonian unbounded from below is physically meaningless, from the
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non-standard quantum mechanics perspective5. As TU inevitably transforms the sys-
tem’s energy as TUHTU−1 = −H, it follows that it fails to represent time reversal as
specified by OA.
III. Finally, the momentum-based argument can be sketched as following
(1) Assume that TU fairly represents time reversal
(2c) If TU represents time reversal, TU must transform momentum as TPT−1 = − P
(3c) As matter of fact, TU leaves momentum invariant, TUPTU−1 = P
(C) TU does not represents time reversal
The reasons for momentum’s sign to change under time reversal turns out to be
somewhat unclear in the literature (though Roberts 2017 introduces a clearer
and purely quantum-based argument to ground this premise). On the one hand,
the reasoning seems to take roots in an analogy with time reversal in classical
mechanics. Robert Sachs for instance imposes that B[time reversal must] con-
form to the requirements of the correspondence principle –namely, operators
representing classical kinematic observables must transform under T in a man-
ner corresponding to classical motion reversal.^ (1987: 34). For Leslie
Ballentine, time reversal flips the sign of momentum in quantum mechanics
by definition (1998: 377–378), and, in the same vein, Albert Messiah (1966)
simply defines time reversal as transforming r (position) and p (momentum)
into r and –p respectively (see Messiah 1966: 667, see Davies 1974: 24–25 for
an akin definition). Roberts mentions that Bthere is a natural perspective on the
nature of time according to which quantities like momentum and spin really do
change sign when time-reversed^ (2017: 317, italics mine).
4.2 An underlying relationalist metaphysics of time
The above-introduced arguments intend to establish the form of T mainly based on
formal and physical reasons. Next, I will show that metaphysical commitments with
respect to the nature of time underlie and support them.
As is widely known, there are metaphysically two views about the nature of time.
Substantivalists with respect to time claim that time is an entity that exists indepen-
dently of events and things placed within it. On the contrary, relationalists support the
idea that time intrinsically depends on events and on things in it. My point here is that
the ways in which time-reversal operators are formally characterized follow from being
5 The predicates Bpositive^ or Bnegative^ for the energy spectrum, or Bunbounded from below/from above^
for Hamiltonians are actually matter of convention. So, the argument could not hinge on which predicate one
adopts to describe the system properly. The real problem is not whether or not the Hamiltonian is unbounded
from below. The problem is if one starts with a Hamiltonian unbounded from above (but bounded from below)
and one ends up with a Hamiltonian unbounded from below (but bounded from above) after a transformation.
In some sense, the problem is if there is in general a bound at all. More precisely, a specific Hamiltonian must
be bounded (from above or from below), and the problem would come up if one adopts a transformation that
turns a Hamiltonian unbounded from above (bounded from below) into a Hamiltonian unbounded from below
(bounded from above), so that Hamiltonians (in general) could adopt either of the bounds.
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engaged in one of the two sides in the metaphysical debate about the nature of time.
Particularly, OA relies on a relationalist metaphysics of time, while HAmay be soundly
defended from a substantivalist one.
There are many different sorts of relationalist-like views that, in general, share the
idea that time is nothing over and above temporal relations among events and things
(Benovsky 2010: 492), though they can greatly vary on what it is considered as
objective and fundamental in the physical world (see Sklar 1974, Earman 1989,
Pooley 2013, for comprehensive overviews of the different kinds of relationalisms).
Furthermore, they can also diverge on how robust the temporal structure (boiled down
to relations among things or events) should be. For instance, Barbour and Bertotti
(1982) have argued for a Machian relationalism in physics according to which an
absolute temporal-ordering structure is assumed for classical mechanics (see Gryb and
Thébault 2016 for a defense of a Machian-moderate relationalism in quantum gravity).
Carlo Rovelli (2002, 2004) has instead argued for a radical relationalism according to
which there is not even a fundamental time-ordering structure in quantum gravity. A
more robust relationalism seems to be defended by Esfeld and Deckert (2018) as
change not only exhibits a temporal order but also a direction (Esfeld and Deckert
2018: 31).
Be that as it may, I will henceforth take the relationalist-like view on time as
supporting two theses:
& R1 There are only events or physical bodies in the world (which can have intrinsic
properties or not), and their (spatio) temporal relations. There is no external time.
& R2 Time is nothing but change. The sort of relation between the physical world and
the concept of ‘time’ is that of Leibnizian representation or Machian-abstraction:
time is an ideal, unreal entity parasitic on events-things’ changing.
According to these tenets, the variable t occurring in the majority of physical theories
(setting aside general relativity) is merely an external unreal parameter, which should
not be taken as representing something with physical meaning. However, I am partic-
ularly interested in how this metaphysical background underlies the defense and
characterization of time reversal as TA in quantum theories.
To start with, the T : t→ − t transformation must not be taken too seriously. It would
be naïve to take T as performing a physically relevant action upon dynamical equations.
Instead, time reversal should be considered as a Bshortcut^ standing for a bunch of
dynamically relevant transformations. As one is mainly interested in equation of
motions, the physical meaning of time reversal is entirely exhausted by the dynamically
relevant transformations that relate to the motion of a system. In a nutshell, time
reversal is nothing but motion reversal, and thereby the time-reversal transformation
should be explicated as a bunch of dynamically relevant transformations that reverses
the original direction of the motion. Think of a classical particle moving from point x1
to x2 in the time interval Δt = t2 − t1. To say BI will time reverse the system by applying
T^ is simply a shortcut for BI will motion reverse the system by applying a bunch of
dynamically relevant transformations to take the system back to the initial state^. In this
toy example, the T-operator should be properly spelt out into the moment
transformation P : p→ − p, and the position transformation X : x→ x. The transforma-
tion T : t→ − t is physically meaningless, and must be merely regarded as a simple re-
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parametrization of the variable t. The physically relevant content of time reversal is
fully exhausted by the moment transformation and the position transformation as
specified above.
In the light of this, the theory-dependent nature of the T-operator is quite clear. The
dynamically relevant variables related to motion change from theory to theory, so the
features of T must also change accordingly. That is why the mathematical form of T
must be in each case figured out by identifying the adequate magnitudes related to
spatial and time translation, and reversing them properly so as to get to the state one
began with. The defense of TA in quantum theories is just an instance of this more
general maneuver. Thus, a T-operator from a relationalist metaphysics of time is defined
as follows
TRel (a) A physically meaningless re-parametrization of t by T : t→ − t
(b) A change of all dynamically relevant magnitudes so as to generate a
moving-backward system (involution), which is expressed by exten-
sionally specifying the bunch of dynamically relevant transformations.
This relationalist metaphysical background undoubtedly underlies Wigner’s defi-
nition (4a) of time reversal as an involution. According to definition (4a), a fair
characterization of the T-operator crucially depends on changing the dynamically
relevant variables so as to guarantee the existence of the second time translation
after applying the first time reversal transformation. Any intended time-reversal
transformation that fails to yield the second time translation will by definition be
flawed, precisely because it fails to generate a backward-headed movement. The
very existence of the second time translation is what precisely assures that we are
really applying a time (motion)-reversal transformation correctly. Therefore, the
metaphysical reason to discard TU as a time-reversal operator is that it fails to
generate the existence of the second time translation, and to thereby reverse
motion. In other words, TU fails to be a time-reversal operator because it fails to
be a motion-reversal operator. Most specialized textbooks takes this point for
granted in claiming that time reversal is nothing but motion reversal (Wigner
1932: 325, Sakurai and Napolitano 2011: 266), warning us that Bno metaphysical
notion of reversal of the direction of the flow of time is involved^ by means of the
T-operator (Gibson and Polland 1976: 177) or that the notion of Btime reversal is
misleading^ and one should rather refer to motion reversal (Ballentine 1998: 377).
Strictly speaking, the notion of time reversal is neither misleading, nor metaphys-
ically misguided: as time is just an abstraction at which we arrive by means of
motion (paraphrasing Mach’s expression, Mach 1919: 224), time reversal is
simply an abstraction of motion reversal.
What about time-reversal invariance? The symmetry of time reversal sheds light on
the structure of the change in physical theories: there is no further structure of time
outside of the structure of change. Time-reversal invariance outwardly regards whether
physical theories imply that the change is necessarily directed. As was shown before,
relationalism does not commit a priori to a particular time structure, but this should be
unveiled by means of varied time symmetries (time translation, time reversal, time
relabeling, and so on). Yet, the central point to be stressed here is that previously-
assumed metaphysical commitments with respect to the nature of time are what
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prescribes upon what time reversal is supposed to act so as to generate a moving-
backward time translation. As time is considered non-physical, the time-reversal
transformation has to act upon dynamically relevant magnitudes in a certain way, and
the time-reversal operator is essentially the bunch of dynamically relevant transforma-
tions that guarantee a reversion of the direction of motion.
5 Shifting gears: A substantivalist metaphysics of time for HA and how
to overcome OA’s arguments
Metaphysics comes first in the sense that determines not only what time reversal actually
is but also upon what it is supposed to act. There is no shadow of doubt that on a
relationalist basis, time reversal must be represented by TA. But when one shifts gears,
OA’s arguments lose its dispositive force. Suppose now that one has sound reasons to
decline such a relationalist basis for time and to rather turn to a substantivalist one. How
should time reversal be now metaphysically and formally characterized?
As in the case of the relationalism, there are also many versions of substantivalist
views on time (see Sklar 1974, Earman 1989, Pooley 2013 for comprehensive
overviews of different kinds of substantivalisms). TimMaudlin has famously supported
a substantivalist view on space and time (particularly, a Galilean or Neo-Newtonian
space-time, see Maudlin 1993), wherein the direction of time is intrinsic to space-time
itself (see Maudlin 2002: 259). A sophisticated ‘anti-haccceitist’ substantivalism has
been defended by Brighouse (1994), Carl Hoefer (1996), Caulton and Butterfield
(2012), among others, in the context of general relativity. Furthermore, the scientific
literature typically accounts for time in classical mechanics, special relativity, relativ-
istic and non-relativistic quantum mechanics, and even string theory as a Bparameter
presumed by, and hence independent of, dynamics^ (Huggett et al. 2012: 242). These
theories are all background dependent in the sense that posit a space-temporal structure
which lies outside the scope of dynamics6.
I will take substantivalism as the position supporting the following two theses:
& S1 Time is a theoretical entity endowed with a structure that is intrinsic to it, and
independent of change. Temporal relations among events or things are parasitic on
this theoretical entity.
& S2 Time is not an ideal or representational notion but it plays a physically
meaningful role so as to explain different phenomena or to define dynamical
variables. Time cannot thereby be boiled down to a dynamical basis.
Naturally, S1 and S2 regard that time plays a physical role in physical theories that must be
considered to be prior to change, and independent of it. The structure of time is fixed
absolutely, irrespectively of changes in the world, and thus the structure of change
supervenes upon the structure of time. In this sense, time can be said to be Bsubstantival^.
6 Certainly, I would be naïve to infer from these theoretical considerations that one must engage a
susbtantivalist metaphysics of space-time: the structure may be otiose and, from a ‘more parsimonious’ stance
in respect of ontology, eliminable. However, it is also true that standard formulations of those physical theories
do countenance a substantivalist-like viewpoint.
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In the light of this view, how must time reversal, thus, be characterized? For the one
thing, as time stands by itself, there are no metaphysical reasons for time to be
explicated as a bunch of dynamically relevant transformations; quite to the contrary,
time reversal is metaphysically and conceptually prior to any other dynamically
relevant transformation, and the latter must be specified in function of the former. In
which way other magnitudes behave under time reversal follows from what sort of
physical and formal relations they keep with respect to time within a specific theory
(e.g. whether they are first-time derivative, and so on). For another thing, as time is now
a physically meaningful external parameter, an inversion of the direction of time must
outwardly mean an inversion of the external parameter itself. This view of time reversal
seems to be in Jill North’s mind when she claims:
BWhat is a time reversal transformation? Just a flipping of the direction of time!
That is all there is to a transformation that changes how things are with respect to
time: change the direction of time itself^ (North 2009: 212. Emphasis added)
The meaning of time reversal is therefore completely exhausted by the transformation T :
t→ − t; and, as said above, the rest of dynamical transformations supervene on it. By
assumption, this transformation has physical relevance and have not to be considered as an
unphysical re-parametrization. Then, a T-operator from S1 and S2 is defined as follows
TSub (a) A change of the direction of time T : t→ − t
(b) A change of all magnitudes that are expressed or represented in
function of time within the theory
To begin with, the T-operator is no longer demanded to produce an involution.
Metaphysically, this is clear from a substantivalist metaphysics as defined above: if
time is prior and independent of change (or movement), then a specific behavior of
change (as a moving-backward physical system) cannot define, or be equivalent to, a
reversion of time. The situation is indeed the opposite: time reversal is expressible
independently of an inversion of the direction of motion. To define the direction of time
in terms of the direction of motion would be as putting the cart before the horses. Under
specific circumstances, an inversion of the direction of time may lead to an involution;
for instance, when the dynamically relevant magnitudes that define the state and/or the
direction of motion are first-time derivative (as velocity in Newtonian classical me-
chanics). But this is not a desideratum to be held universally and necessarily. It might
be the case that time reversal fails to generate an involution, and then that a change of
the direction of time would not lead to an inversion of the direction of motion (as it
happens in non-relativistic quantum mechanics from TSub). As a result, the involution-
based argument no longer runs. Particularly, because the premise (2a) does not hold to
be true in the light of TSub.
Let me make the same point slightly differently. According to Wigner’s definition
(4a) of time reversal, the existence of the second time translation must be guaranteed to
set the form of T properly. TU was precisely discarded for not being able to meet (4a),
but this rationale no longer runs when a substantivalist view on time is rather assumed.
In some sense, TSub is at odds with Wigner’s definition of time reversal because
definition (4a) demands further actions to represent time reversal of which are actually
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necessary conforming to S1, S2 and TSub. Under this view, time reversal looks much
more like a reflection than like an involution. Hence, TU can be re-established on the
proper metaphysical ground to the extent that it fairly represents such a reflection (see
Arntzenius 1997 and Savitt 1996: chapter 1 for time reversal as a reflection).
Besides the involution-based argument and the metaphysical reasons to support HA,
the rest of the physical arguments raised by OA against HA must also be overcome. Let
us see in which way HA along with TSub cope with the momentum-based and the
Hamiltonian-based argument.
(a) Overcoming momentum-based argument
The transformation rule for momentum as TPT−1 = − P is typically introduced in non-
relativistic quantum mechanics by appealing to its obviousness: if time reversal aims at
representing something like a backward movement, then reversing the sign of momen-
tum seems mandatory as what one is in need of restoring a past-headed physically
possible evolution. And this partially explains why some definitions of time reversal are
sometimes expressly introduced in terms of changing momentum (Messiah 1966;
Davies 1974; Sachs 1987) or why it is so Bnatural^ to expect momentum to change
its sign under time reversal (Earman 2002; Roberts 2017).
Craig Callender (2000) and David Albert (2000) have singly introduced non-standard
approaches to time reversal wherein the transformation rule for momentum does not hold
in some cases. Let me take a slightly different path to overcome the momentum-based
argument, and claim that there is a reasonable way from TSub in which the transformation
rule for momentum could not hold in some cases, specially, in quantum mechanics.
Recall that the t→ − t transformation is not a simple physically meaningless
shortcut according to TSub, but it concentrates the whole physical meaning of what
time reversal is. Hence, the T-operator does not need to be reduced to or explicated as a
bunch of dynamically relevant transformations. Whether momentum’s sign must flip
under time reversal or not mainly depends on the sort of relation that the magnitude
holds with time according to the physical theory at issue. Let me spell it out by
comparing Newtonian classical mechanics and non-relativistic quantum mechanics.
In the former, to the extent that velocity involves the first derivative with respect to t,
one logically obtains that particles’ velocities must also be transformed under T. Then,
as any Newtonian state is completely defined in terms of position x and velocity v, the
way time reversal should transform the state follows from the fact that the T-operator
flips the sign of velocity because velocity is a first-time derivate magnitude. Thus, as
long as momentum is defined within the theory as
p ¼ mv ¼ m Δd
Δt
ð5Þ
it follows logically (taking Callender’s expression, Callender 2000) that momentum
must also change its sign under T. To be clear: momentum changes under time reversal
because, firstly, the time-reversal operator was defined as performing t→ − t and
changing all time-derivative magnitude, and secondly, because momentum is defined
as a first-time-derivative magnitude in Newtonian classical mechanics. There is no need
to wonder whether time reversal must in general involve a reversion of the direction of
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motion, or if it must feature further properties by definition: TSub only commits to such a
minimum T-operator which acts just like a reflection. Obviously, to claim that such a
reflection is physically meaningless is to accept neither S1 nor S2.
It is worth noticing that in Newtonian classical mechanics, a time-reversed evolution
(provided that external forces have been ruled out) in fact looks like an inversion of the
direction of motion, but this is a side effect of both TSub and the mathematical-physical
structure of Newtonian classical mechanics (since it involves certain laws and not
others, momentum is defined as time-derivative and rather than in some other way, and
so forth). That a time-reversed evolution looks like a going-backward movement is an
effect or consequence of and not a definition of time reversal.
So, according to TSub, when one goes on to apply T in the realm of quantum
mechanics, one should not beforehand expect momentum to change under time
reversal. First of all, as the definitions of quantities change across theories, one should
firstly draw the attention to how momentum is formally represented in standard
quantum mechanics. As it is well-known, momentum is now an operator (P) defined as
P ψð Þ ¼ −iħ ∂ψ
∂x
ð6Þ
As matter of fact, momentum is no longer a time-derivative quantity, but is a space-
derivative one that plays the role of being the generator of an infinitesimal spatial
translation. So, let us look at the facts from TSub’s viewpoint. On the one hand, T need
not feature any reference to any particular magnitude, so why should one beforehand
expect that a certain magnitude behaves in a specific way? On the other hand, TSub’s
definition refers intensionally to how other magnitudes behave under time reversal, a
point implicitly suggested by Callender (2000): wherever you find a time-derivative
magnitude in a theory, invert its sign accordingly. So, why should one expect a space-
derivative magnitude to change sign under T? That is the reason why it looks quite
unnatural to reverse the sign of momentum in quantum mechanics from TSub and HA: it
is not a time-derivative magnitude and it is thus out of the range of the T-operator.
(b) Overcoming the Hamiltonian-based argument
As to the demand of preserving the Hamiltonian’s energy within the positive spectrum,
the HA’s counter-argument runs similarly. The essence of such premise is, putting it
simply, that Schrödinger’s equation must render a physically meaningful solution upon
change in the direction of time. So, it is a fundamental feature of TA in non-relativistic
quantum mechanics that it prevents negative energy solutions from coming up. It
would be no possible to generate the second time translation in Wigner’s (4a) if the
T-operator changes the Hamiltonian’s sign.
However, from HA and TSub, any sign’s changing follows from whether physical
magnitudes are expressed as time derivative or not. Non-relativistic quantum mechan-
ics undoubtedly sets up a strong relation between time and the system’s energy (its
Hamiltonian). In its simplest form, the Hamiltonian operator can be written down as
H ¼ iħ ∂
∂t
ð7Þ
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As in the case of momentum in Newtonian classical mechanics, such definition points
out to a tied-up relation between the Hamiltonian and time. From TSub, the Hamilto-
nian’s sign is logically inverted under time reversal because it is defined in function of
time. Arguing that the T-operator should leave invariant certain quantities in quantum
mechanics misses the point, since the proper definition of TSub and the metaphysical
background of HA do not reflect such concern. To be clear: TU changing of the
Hamiltonian’s sign is just what it is meant to do according to TSub and HA, and this
change is just a particular case of a general rule that is supposed to be applied wherever
TSub holds.
However, one can go deeper into the reasoning. One of the motivations not to regard
TU as a well-behaved time-reversal operator is that it renders no solution when the
direction of time is inverted. Conversely, the legitimacy of TA is grounded on the fact
that it does turn solutions into solutions. But this requirement only makes sense if time
reversal aims at representing an involution. As mentioned above, the generation of such
an involution is a sine-qua-non condition for representing time reversal properly
from TRel; thereby, the second time translation must also be a solution according to
the dynamical equation. But, from TSub, time reversal is not demanded to represent an
involution, so the argument is neutralized.
It is worth stressing that non-relativistic quantum mechanics is non-invariant
under TU, that is, non-time-reversal invariant from TSub and HA. At first glance,
this seems to be scandalously problematic, and as a compelling reason to throw
the whole package away. However, I think that things must be approached from
the appropriate angle. The fact that non-relativistic quantum mechanics is non-
TU-invariant by no means implies that it is not motion-reversal invariant or TA-
invariant. The theory is as motion-reversal invariant as it was from TRel and
OA. The point is that TA can no longer stand for time reversal because
according to TSub and HA time reversal and motion reversal are two quite
different transformations, and thereby lead to different symmetries. The ratio-
nale is mainly conceptual: HA does not preclude finding a way to represent
motion reversal (and TA is likely the best candidate for it), nor does it argue
that TU is actually motion reversal. This would be a rotund non-sense. The
philosophical claim is that time and motion have to be distinguished, and thus
that an inversion of the direction of time not necessarily collapses with an
inversion of the direction of motion. Furthermore, if physical theories are (for
any reason) demanded to be motion-reversal invariant (e.g., it could reasonably
be a condition one wishes to preserve in a physical theory), and time is nothing
but motion, then this directly entails that theories must be time-reversal invari-
ant. But the implication heavily relies on taking the conjunction as true, and
clearly TSub and HA might remain reluctant to accept it. Under HA, it makes
full sense that a theory is simultaneously motion-reversal invariant and non-
time-reversal invariant.
6 Final remarks
Let me summarize the points I’ve made along the article and put all pieces
together. I have argued in favor of the legitimacy of two different approaches to
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represent time reversal in non-relativistic quantum mechanics against the con-
ventional understanding that only one can be correct. The grounds for doing so
was that OA, which promotes TA as the right way to represent time reversal
(defined in terms of TRel) in standard quantum mechanics assumes a
relationalist metaphysics of time (which I’ve summarized in the tenets R1
and R2), and the physical arguments to support OA are largely dependent on
such a metaphysical stance. But when one turns to a substantivalist metaphysics
of time (summarized in the tenets S1 and S2), an alternative approach, HA,
comes up more naturally in terms of TU. Many of the arguments to throw HA
away can be neutralized by defining time reversal in terms of TSub. When
methodological and physical considerations are set alongside metaphysical com-
mitments, the two approaches to time reversal emerge as coherent and tenable.
This conclusion paves the way to re-think some of the metaphysical prob-
lems that have largely depended upon the notion of time reversal in physics.
For instance, the problem of the arrow of time is usually posed in terms of
whether our fundamental dynamical equations are time-reversal invariant. Typ-
ically, such laws are taken to be time-reversal invariant and, thereby, blind to
the direction of time. However, my analysis in this article offers some grounds
for caution regarding such claims. Much of the philosophical meaning of the
notion of ‘time reversal’ lies on our understanding of the nature of time, upon
which time reversal is supposed to act. Not only are the answers to those
questions non-univocal, but, furthermore, both ways to represent time reversal
in quantum theories would enable quite different metaphysical scenarios with
respect to the arrow of time debate. From time substantivalism holding TSub,
one has sound reasons to claim that at least that one fundamental dynamical
law (Schrödinger’s equation) is non-time-reversal invariant as it is non-TU-
invariant. From a relationalist metaphysics of time, one has instead strong
reason to believe the opposite and to remain sympathetic to the mainstream
view.
It is worth re-stressing that nothing here implies that what physicists and
philosophers of physics have extensively taken as a symmetry of the theory
was never really a symmetry of the theory. In fact, bracketing the names ‘time
reversal’ and ‘motion reversal’, standard quantum mechanics is as non-TU-
invariant as it is TA-invariant under any respect. The point is that one side of
the debate comes to regard TU as non-physical and to identify motion with time
under the same transformation (TA). The other side of the debate regards TU as
a physical transformation acting upon time itself, where motion and time are
metaphysically different. For this reason, nothing of the empirical or theoretical
gain of TA-symmetry disappears. From HA the situation just becomes ‘unfold-
ed’: therein a metaphysical identification was carried out, one should break it
down into two transformations: motion reversal on the one side, and time
reversal on the other.
Which metaphysical background should be abandoned and which should be en-
dorsed is still an ongoing discussion in metaphysics and philosophy of physics.
Although plenty of empirical and theoretical research in physics seems to favor
relationalism of (space)-time, substantivalism has not been abandoned yet, and many
substantivalists still lie in wait.
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